Recent historians need to fashion patches for their accounts of the fighting on the North Anna River May 24, 1864. As I followed the Petersburg Regiment of Weisiger's Virginia Brigade of Mahone's division down to the North Anna, I could see a conflict between sources in the regiment and general histories of the campaign. Sources from the Petersburg Regiment reported fighting Crawford's division of V Corps as Ledlie's brigade of IX Corps dashed itself to pieces against the Mississippi Brigade of Mahone's division to the right of the Virginia Brigade. I considered deferring to the judgment of the general historians but decided to take a look. The men from the 12th Virginia, the Petersburg Regiment, were right. Sources on Bates' (Coulter's until Coulter was wounded) brigade of Crawford's division (11th Pennsylvania, 12th Pennsylvania, 12th Massachusetts, 97th New York, all available online) show that this brigade struggled with the sharpshooters of Weisiger's Virginia Brigade and Sanders' Alabama Brigade as Ledlie's brigade assaulted the Mississippians.
My last post, on Pickett's Charge, may seem odd for a blog entitled The Petersburg Campaign. I'm a student of the 12th Virginia Infantry, however, which was also known as The Petersburg Regiment because it had, in its final form, six of ten companies from the Cockade City. This regiment belonged to Mahone's Brigade, which at Gettysburg formed part of Anderson's Division. I'm putting the finishing touches on a history of the 12th Virginia with nine diagrams and thirty-two maps by Hampton Newsome, Esq., author of Richmond Must Fall (on the October battles around the Cockade City) and co-editor (with Dr. John Selby and me) of Civil War Talks: Further Reminiscences of George S. Bernard and His Fellow Veterans. Civil War Talks is the sequel to War Talks of Confederate Veterans, published by Bernard in 1892. Civil War Talks was ready for publication in 1896 but disappeared until it showed up in a flea marked in 2004. Purchased at a flea market for $50 by some lucky fellow, it was sold to the History Museum of Western Virginia for $15,000!
Mathematical modeling based on Lanchester equations developed during the First World War to determine the numbers necessary for successful assaults shows that with the commitment of one to three more infantry brigades to the nine brigades in the initial force, Pickett’s Charge would probably have taken the Union position and altered the battle’s outcome, but the Confederates would likely have been unable to exploit such a success without the commitment of still more troops. Michael J. Armstrong and Steven E. Soderbergh, “Refighting Pickett’s Charge: mathematical modeling of the Civil War battlefield,” Social Science Quarterly 96, No. 4 (May 14, 2015), 1153-1168. The authors do not include Wilcox’s and Lang’s brigades in the initial force. Ibid., 161. Timelier commitment of Anderson’s entire division with the initial force would have supplied five additional brigades and from 4,950 more men, making the attack force fourteen brigades and almost 18,000 men. Ibid., 161, 164. According to the modeling, this number would have practically guaranteed a lodgment at the Angle and refuted Longstreet’s assertion that “thirty thousand men was the minimum of force necessary.” Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 386.
Everybody interested in the Civil War ought to try writing a regimental history. It gives you a yardstick for measuring the accuracy of more general works.
I don't recommend duplicating a previous regimental history. Sometimes that can be embarrassing. A few years ago a book came out on the 57th Massachusetts, Mother May You Never See the Sights I Have Seen. Unfortunately, the regimental history it was intended to replace (by John C. Anderson), remains a better book.
Plenty of good regimental histories exist, particularly for Federal regiments, In the brigade I'm going to mention, Foster's brigade of Terry's division, X Corps (and later XXIV Corps), Army of the James, fine histories exist on the 11th Maine, 24th Massachusetts and 100th New York. On the other hand, by "regimental history," I don't mean the historical sketches that accompany the rosters in John C. Rigdon's books or the H. E. Howard regimental history series--they shouldn't stop anybody from writing a true regimental history if enough documents can be found.
The existence of documents is extremely important. There will be sufficient docoments for regimentals on many Federal regiments. Confederate regiments are another matter. When I picked a regiment to write about, I considered the 12th Virginia, the 12th Mississippi and the 29th United States Colored Troops. I had relatives in the 12th Virginia and 12th Mississippi. The 29th United States Colored Troops were recruited in my state, the Sucker State, Illinois. (The name comes from a bottom-feeding fish, not the electorate foolish enough to elect and reelect politicians who are bankrupting the state.) There were individuals in the 12th Virginia who left more writings that the 12th Mississippi and 29th United States Colored Troops put together, so the decision to write about the 12th Virginia was easy. The existence of an historical sketch with the H. E. Howard roster did not deter me because the sketch made practically no use of what I estimate as eight to ten volumes of writings.
The unit that strikes me as ripe for a regimental history is the 10th Connecticut, which Fox included among the 300 Fighting Regiments of the United States Army. The Connecticut Historical Society has documents from practically every company. The chaplain left a memoir of his own and a biography of one of the regiment's field officers. The U. S. Army Heritage and Education Center has a few letters. The 10th participated in the seizure of the North Carolina sounds in 1862, the Siege of Charleston in 1863 and the Siege of Petersburg in 1864-65.
Somebody connected with the 10th Connecticut should get to work on its history.
It was a few years ago that Ted Savas contacted me about writing the revision of The Destruction of the Weldon Railroad that became The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864. SavasBeatie does a fine job with its books. They can do footnotes, which I greatly prefer to endnotes. They use fonts that are easily read by old cadgers such as myself. They take care of their authors, as well. In 2015 SavasBeatie arranged for me to speak to the Chicago Civil War Round Table (CWRT), do an interview at Chicago's Abraham Lincoln Bookshop, and do a book-signing at Petersburg National Battlefield Park. This year SavasBeatie set me up to speak to Northern Illinois CWRT, Salt Creek CWRT, Lincoln-Davis CWRT, and South Suburban CWRT. Next year I expect to talk to the Orange County (Ca.) CWRT, the Greater Orlando CWRT, the San Francisco CWRT and the Civil Warriors CWRT in Los Angeles. I might have been able to do more but I'm still practicing law.
Thank you, members of the Lincoln-Davis and South Suburban Civil War Round Tables. It was very kind of you to invite me to talk about the fighting around Petersburg in August 1864. Both of your meetings are within a few miles of my home and office, and I elected to focus on color bearer and Medal of Honor winner Pvt. Henry M. Hardenbergh of Company G, the Preacher's Company, of the 39th Illinois Veteran Volunteers (Yates Phalanx). On August 16, 1864, the day Hardenbergh won his Medal of Honor by capturing the flag of the 10th Alabama, the 39th lost thirty-six killed or mortally wounded out of scarcely more than 200 taken into action.
I learned from you, too. At the Lincoln-Davis meeting, I learned that descendants of the Indians who inhabited Cook and Will Counties, Illinois, still live among us. At the South Suburban Civil War Round Table I learned that Atlanta's famous Cyclorama, the painting depicting the Battle of Atlanta on July 22, 1864, has in it a soldier with the face of none other than Clark Gable! I can't wait to visit the Cyclorama as soon as it reopens.
One could win a marshal's baton (the symbol of the rank) by winning a major battle as well as capturing a major fortress. The Confederacy, however, would have produced fewer field marshals than the Union had the rank existed for them.
General Joseph E. Johnson might have won a marshal's baton for First Manassas. Nothing he did after that merited one.
General Albert Sidney Johnson did nothing to merit a marshal's baton.
General Robert E. Lee won several victories that could have made him a field marshal--The Seven Days, Second Manassas, the capture of Harper's Ferry, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville.
General Braxton Bragg's victory at Chickamauga would have earned him a marshal's baton had the field marshal's rank existed.
What about General Pierre Gustave Toutant "Gus" Beauregard? His service as unofficial chief of staff at First Manassas would not have made him a field marshal. His successful defense of Charleston in 1863 might have. His victory over Beast Butler at Second Drewry's Bluff on May 16, 1864 might have. His successful defense of Petersburg June 15-18, 1864, also might have. The Davis Administration would probably not have given him the benefit of the doubt, though--Beauregard and Davis detested one another.
Field Marshal is the highest military rank of many countries, but not of the United States. To become a field marshal, one must capture a significant city (Field Marshal Erwin Rommel of Tobruk or Field Marshal Erich von Manstein of Sevastopol), a significant area (Field Marshal Wavell of Cyrenaica), or win a significant battle (Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery of El Alamein).
Just imagine if the United States Army had had such a rank during the Civil War. We might have had Field Marshal Grant of Fort Donelson and Vicksburg, Field Marshal Burnside of Pamlico Sound, Field Marshal Butler of New Orleans, Field Marshal Buell of Nashville, Field Marshal Banks of Port Hudson, Field Marshal Rosecrans of Chattanooga, Field Marshal Sherman of Atlanta and Savannah, Field Marshal Terry of Fort Fisher, and Field Marshal Canby of Mobile. President Lincoln would probably have had to promote Little Mac to Field Marshal of Antietam to justify issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation.
Diversionary railroad raids exhausted General Grant’s repertoire when it came to cavalry. During the climax of the Vicksburg Campaign,
as his infantry crossed the Mississippi below that Secessionist citadel, Grant had
sent a brigade of horse soldiers southward from LaGrange, Tennessee through
Mississippi to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, ripping up rails, burning cross-ties,
breaking bridges, destroying enemy supplies, tying down enemy infantry in
defense of the vital rail link between Vicksburg and Jackson, and generally
confusing the Confederates. The raid thus contributed to Grant’s
investment and capture of the Gibraltar of the West. During the Overland Campaign, the
general-in-chief had dispatched Sheridan with three divisions of horsemen from
Spotsylvania to defeat Maj. Gen. J. E. B. “Jeb” Stuart, disrupt the railroad
lines supplying Lee’s army, and threaten Richmond. Sheridan accomplished little beyond defeating
and killing Stuart, whom Lee ultimately replaced with a better cavalry
commander—Hampton, the war’s best commander of an army’s cavalry corps.
By sending his cavalry off to divert his
enemy’s attention by ripping up rails, Grant deprived himself of horsemen for
screening and reconnaissance, their traditional functions. The principal value of Sheridan’s raids lay
in that they forced Lee to dispatch his cavalry in pursuit. Unlike Grant, the Southern chieftain employed
his horse soldiers extensively in reconnaissance and screening. For Lee, cavalry functioned as a sensory
organ. The absence of most of Lee’s
horsemen in pursuit of Sheridan on the Trevilian Raid left the Secessionist
commander nearly blind and contributed to the success of Grant’s James
crossing. Grant no sooner gave up his assaults on Petersburg in June 1864 than he launched what cavalry remained with him on a raid against the Weldon, South Side, and Danville railroads.
 The great film director John Ford
made a movie based on Grierson’s raid, entitled The Horse Soldiers (1959).
 Though Nathan Bedford Forrest
proved formidable in independent command, he performed poorly in command of
part of the Army of Tennessee’s cavalry.
David Powell, Failure in the
Saddle:Nathan Bedford Forrest, Joseph Wheeler, and the Confederate Cavalry in
the Chickamauga Campaign (El Dorado Hills, Ca., 2011), 205-212,
Throw out your books on the second day at Gettysburg. They all need rewriting.
Confusion still exists about what Mahone's Brigade of Anderson's Division did, or did not do, at Gettysburg on July 2, 1863. We know that the attack of Anderson's Division broke down in Posey's Mississippi Brigade, to the immediate right (south) of Mahone's Brigade. We know that a message for Mahone to advance was received with incredulity by General Mahone, who said he had just received an order from General Anderson to stay put on McPherson's Ridge.
There is no question but that Mahone received an order from Anderson to stay put on McPherson's Ridge. Douglas Southall Freeman is among those responsible for the confusion. Longstreet's memoir, From Manassas to Appomattox was available when Freeman wrote. Longstreet was in charge of the attack on Cemetery Ridge on July 2. He says the plan was for Anderson's division to attack with four brigades. OR 27. 2:332, 343. Anderson's division had five brigades. Therefore one brigade was not to attack. That this brigade was Mahone's would be apparent from its position alone if it were not for Mahone's account of the matter. All Freeman had to do was remember that Anderson's Division had five brigades, not four.
As for what Mahone's Brigade did after the confusion caused by Anderson's contradictory orders was sorted out, there was a book in publication at the time Freeman wrote that should have informed him of the action of the Virginians. That book is William H. Stewart's A Pair of Blankets, published in 1911 (at 97-98). Mahone's Brigade sidled to the right and advanced behind the right of Posey's Brigade. See also James Eldred Phillips Memoir, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia; Hampton
Newsome, John Horn and John G. Selby, eds., Civil
War Talks: Further Reminiscences of George S. Bernard and His Fellow Veterans
(Charlottesville, 2012), 133, 155-156.Posey confirmed that Mahone was ordered to the right.Report
of Brig. Gen. Carnot Posey, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, OR, 27, 2:634.
After I compiled the statistics on the 12th Virginia Infantry, it was easy to compare the regiment with many of its Federal opponents. I had only to look up their statistics in Fox's Regimental Losses and a couple of post-war compilations from New York and Pennsylvania.
It was harder to compare the 12th Virginia's statistics with statistics on other Confederate regiments. Such statistics are difficult to come by, but they exist. I found a lot of partial statistics, only a few complete ones. Some were published, and others I had to count myself. Here's what I came up with:
criterion for Fox’s Fighting 300 Regiments (130 or 10% killed or died of wounds).
 Up to March, 1865; probably lost
around 155 killed or mortally wounded.
 The 16th Virginia fought with only
seven companies. The equivalent of 130 killed or mortally
wounded among ten companies for a seven company regiment is ninety-one.
Now it's true, this is by no means a complete study of Southern regimental statistics. Such a study will probably never exist because of the gaps in the records. To me, the questions seem to jump out. Did Mahone's Brigade do its fair share of fighting? Did Virginia?
I'm currently writing about "Barlow's Skedaddle," also known as "the Petersburg Affair," in which three Confederate brigades of Mahone's division routed seven brigades of the Federal II Corps. I have dozens of Unionist sources, mostly in the public domain. Confederate sources, as usual, are proving more difficult to find.
You could call Mahone's division a rainbow division. It had a brigade from each of five states: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and Virginia. My text begins on the evening of June 18, 1864, and I aim to take the reader through June 22. I've just finished the first two chapters, one for the evening of June 18, and the other for June 19. I'm trying to get the reader through the preliminaries by generating a little human interest. That's not hard with Northern sources. Plenty of diaries, letters and memoirs are in the public domain, not to mention the ones in print or manuscript. Southern sources are a different matter.
For the evening of June 18 through June 21, I have nothing from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, or Mississippi. From Virginia, except for A Pair of Blankets by Lt. Col. William H. Stewart of the 61st Virginia, nothing but diaries, letters and memoirs from the soldiers of the 12th Virginia and their relatives in the Cockade City--the 12th was not called the Petersburg Regiment for nothing. In fact, there are at least five soldiers in the 12th who left more material behind than did all the rest of their brigade or, indeed, their division.
For June 22 itself, there is something from every state involved. (The Florida Brigade was not involved that day, though I'll be checking the Army Heritage & Educational Center for material soon anyway.) The proportions of the material available raise a question for me about Southern literacy at the time of the Civil War. I have two sources from Mississippi, four from Alabama, six from Georgia, and at least nine from Virginia. My question is, did literacy diminish as one went west? It looks like that to me.
I'll pay $100 to the first person to reach me with the Letter of William S. Hubbard to "Dear Father," June 25, 1864. Hubbard belonged to the 16th Virginia Infantry. His letter describes his role in Mahone's attack on II Corps June 22, 1864.I have seen this letter cited to Petersburg National Battlefield Park, but the response I have received from the park is that the letter is not there.
It is clear that Lt. Col. G. Moxley Sorrel led the flank attack of May 6, 1864 in the Wilderness. Brig. Gen. William Mahone, the ranking officer involved. later claimed credit for the attack but all the evidence points to Sorrel as the leader of the attack. Sorrel was on the staff of Longstreet's Corps.
On June 23, 1864, the evidence points to Capt. Victor Jean Baptiste Girardey as the officer who led the Florida Brigade of Mahone's Division into position to cut off part of the Vermont Brigade of VI Corps near the Gurley House south of Petersburg. Col. David Lang, the commander of the brigade, later claimed he led the brigade's attack, but the division commander, Mahone, vouched for Girardey. Maybe we can harmonize these accounts by saying that Girardey led the Florida Brigade into position and Lang led the attack. Girardey was on the staff of Mahone's Division.
A similar situation arose on July 30, 1864. Girardey led the Virginia Brigade of Mahone's Division into position to attack at The Crater. Girardey gave the order to attack while in front of the left of the brigade. Colonel David Addison Weisiger, commander of the Virginia Brigade, may have given the order to attack while in front of the right of the brigade. He certainly claimed to have done so. Girardey had long since died, on August 16, 1864 to be exact.
On the whole, the evidence supports the staff officers over the field and general officers. Girardey may have been the finest divisional staff officer of the war. He was promoted to brigadier general after The Crater and died shortly afterward at Second Deep Bottom, August 16, 1864. He may have been the actual leader of Wright's Georgia Brigade at Gettysburg on July 2, 1863.
A preview from The Petersburg Regiment, 12th Virginia Infantry, Copyright John Horn 2016:
Table 7: The
Petersburg Regiment Compared with Some Foes
despite the confusion of battle (particularly in woods), it is possible to
identify the particular enemy regiment or regiments opposing the 12th Virginia
or a portion thereof in a given fight. The
Petersburg Regiment compared very favorably with the average Union regiment,
which lost about five percent. It often
met some of the best regiments in the Federal army, yet compared favorably with
some of them as well.
Regiment Killed or Died of Percentage
of 12th Virginia at)Wounds during WarLost
Meets criterion for inclusion in Fox’s Fighting 300 Regiments (130 or 10%
killed or died of wounds).
Lost a flag to the 12th Virginia that day.
Lost two flags to the 12th Virginia that day.
 My figures come from Fox, Regimental Losses; Samuel P. Bates, History
of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5, Prepared in Compliance with Acts of the
Legislature (5 Volumes) (Harrisburg, 1869); and Frederick Phisterer, New York in the War of the Rebellion (5
Volumes) (Albany, 1912).
Unless Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant or Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman succeeded in capturing or destroying at least one of their objectives (Richmond, the Army of Northern Virginia, Atlanta, or the Army of Tennessee) by November, 1864, President Abraham Lincoln could scarcely hope to win re-election. If Lincoln met with defeat, the country could
expect its then current division to become permanent. A Democrat would occupy the White House who
would, in Lincoln’s words, “have secured his election on such ground that he
could not possibly save [the Union].”
No one had done more than Lincoln himself
to create this predicament. Earlier that
year, before the president appointed Grant general-in-chief of the Union’s
armies, Grant had intended to begin the Campaign of 1864 in the east by
transporting his army by sea to Suffolk, Virginia. He would thus have arrived bloodlessly at a
position similar to his present one, which had cost more than 72,000 casualties
to reach. From Suffolk, he would have headed inland along
the Blackwater River against the railroads connecting Richmond with the Deep South. Lincoln had objected to Grant’s plan because
a move by sea would leave Washington unprotected, something the president’s party
could not tolerate. Such a move would create another problem for
Lincoln. It would admit the correctness
of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan’s bloodless move by sea to the York-James
Peninsula in 1862, though McClellan’s campaign there had ended in failure and
mutual recriminations. Such an admission
would never do, because the 1864 presidential election was shaping up as a
contest between Old Abe and Little Mac.
Lincoln had also meddled in the Campaign
of 1864 in the west by insisting on the Red River Expedition into northwest
Louisiana. This deprived Sherman of
about 10,000 soldiers he was counting on for the beginning of his campaign in north
Georgia. It also precluded an expedition aimed at
Mobile that would have tied up enemy troops sent to defend Atlanta. Against a more capable opponent than Gen.
Joseph E. Johnston, Sherman’s campaign might never have gotten going. Denied about 10,000 more troops on veteran
furloughs, Sherman had to reduce the scope of his plans in a manner that
significantly slowed the progress of his campaign.
In the furor over the casualties incurred
as a result of the change of plans in the east that Lincoln had foisted on
Grant, most of the criticism fell upon the general-in-chief. His nickname of “Unconditional Surrender,”
based on his initials and earned at Fort Donelson—his first great victory—changed
to “Unceasing Slaughter” during his gory progress from the Rapidan to the
James. That Grant never complained about the
Rail-Splitter’s meddling, and just kept going forward, forged a bond of absolute
loyalty between Lincoln and his general-in chief.
 Abraham Lincoln, “Blind
Memorandum,” August 23, 1864. Abraham
Lincoln Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
 Grant’s casualties came to
approximately 72,526. He had lost about
54,926 in the Overland Campaign. General
summary from the Rapidan to the James River, May 5-June 24, 1864, War of the
Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 vols. in 128 parts (Washington, D.C., 1880-1901) Series 1, 36,
1:188 (cited hereinafter asOR,
with no series indicated unless it is other than Series 1. He had lost around 11,386 in his assaults on
Petersburg. Edward H. Bonekemper,
III. A Victor, Not a Butcher: Ulysses S. Grant's Overlooked Military
Genius (Washington, D.C., 2004), 313.
During May, the Army of the James lost approximately 6,214, which I
include in Grant’s losses. Return of Casualties in the Union Forces,
commanded by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, U. S. Army (compiled from nominal
lists of casualties, returns, &c.), May 5-31, OR 36, 2:18; Return of Casualties in the Union Forces,
commanded by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, U. S. Army, June 1-14, OR 36,
 U. S. Grant, Major-General, to Maj.-Gen.
H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief of the Army, January 19, 1864, OR 33:394-395; William Glenn Robertson, Back Door to Richmond: The Bermuda Hundred Campaign, April-June 1864
(Cranbury, N.J., 1987), 13-14; John Horn, The Petersburg Campaign: June
1864-April 1865 (Conshohocken, Pa., 1993), 12-13; Richard M. McMurry, Atlanta 1865: Last Chance for the Confederacy (Lincoln,
Neb., 2000), 12. For the case in favor
of a movement by sea against Richmond’s communications, see William Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, A
Critical History of Operations in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania from the
Commencement to the Close of the War, 1861-1865 (New York, 1882),
406-409. For the case against a movement
by sea against Richmond’s communications, see Andrew A. Humphreys, The Virginia Campaign of ’64 and ’65: The Army of the Potomac and the Army of the
James (New York, 1883), 7-9. Grant’s
memoirs, which include his official report in the appendix to vol. 2, fail to
mention this matter. U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (2 vols.)
(New York, 1886), 2:124-145, 555-632.
 Albert Castel, Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 (Lawrence,
Kan., 1992), 66, 90, 99, 118; McMurry, Atlanta
1864, 52, 54-55.
 The record shows that Gen. Pierre
Gustave Toutant “Gus” Beauregard, though he had no better relations with
Confederate President Jefferson Davis than Johnston, offered a better
choice. Unlike Johnston, who had
scarcely tried to relieve Vicksburg during the summer of 1863, Beauregard had
successfully defended Charleston. In the
spring of 1864, while Johnston steadily retired toward Atlanta, Beauregard gave
battle to Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler and bottled him up in Bermuda Hundred,
then successfully defended Petersburg against assaults by first Butler and
afterward Grant. At times during August
1864, Beauregard counterattacked the Unionists as effectively as Gen. Robert E.
Lee. See John Horn, The Siege of Petersburg: The
Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 (El Dorado Hills, Ca., 2015), 179-183,
The problem for Davis lay in that if Beauregard had
defended Atlanta, who would have defended Petersburg other than Johnston? In that case, the Cockade City could expect,
like Atlanta, to fall into Federal hands and take Richmond along with it before
the November election.
 McMurry, Atlanta 1864, 55, 57-58; Castel, Decision in the West, 99, 121, 123.
The maps and diagrams for The Petersburg Regiment, 12th Virginia Infantry are finished. There are thirty-two maps and eight diagrams. Hampton Newsome has done his usual great job on the maps and diagrams.
Here's an example of the maps:
Here's an example of the diagrams.
My cousin George will start proof-reading the manuscript next week.
My cousin George Zelenack went to the trouble of sniffing out typographical errors in The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864. Thanks, George! Here's what they are:
Page Line Text Suggestion
Viii 6 look
at a history books look
at history books
X 6 missing ling missing
11 3 a find dust a
11 FN11, L9 much more quickly that much more quickly than
30 FN21, L4 “Road roather than” Road rather than
56 P2, L1 “alignng on a lane” aligning on a lane
125 P1, L12 in front of rest of in front of the
345 L17 Dakota.Letter Dakota.
345 L21 Georgia.Nicholas Georgia. (New
paragraph) Nicholas DeGraff….
346 L9 D.C.William D.C. (new paragraph) William Henry Harder….
346 L10 Virginia. Joseph Virginia. (new paragraph) Joseph Hayes….
347 L1 James June 21-August
21 1894 James, June 21-August 21, 1894
347 Sec2, L10 (1889).Day, (1889). Day, W.
363 L2 “misunderstatding” misunderstanding
L13 “misunderstatding” misunderstanding I have found more substantial errors: 1) The Western Brigade of Terry's division on August 16, 1864, attacked not in column of divisions but in column of battalions, and thus with skirmishers not eleven deep but five deep. OR 42, 1:689 ("doubled in column at half distance"), 699 ("doubled on the center...formed in double column"). 2) The Wilson-Kautz Raid did not leave the Richmond & Danville Railroad and the South Side Railroad inoperable until September but only until early July. Greg Eanes, Destroy the Junction: The Wilson-Kautz Raid & the Battle for the Staunton River Bridge, June 21, 1864 to July 1, 1864 (Lynchburg, Va.: H. E. Howard, 1999), 166-168, 207-208. Mea culpa!
On March 23, 2017, at 6 p.m., I'll be talking about a topic within the scope of The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864 at the Greater Orlando Civil War Round Table, Marks Street Senior Recreation Center, 99 E. Marks Street, Orlando, Florida 32803. Books will be available at a discount. I'll happily inscribe any book purchased.
On November 8, 2017, I'll be talking to the Civil Warriors Round Table of Los Andgeles/West SF Valley about the struggle for the Weldon Railroad as depicted in The Siege of Petersburg: The Battles for the Weldon Railroad, August 1864. The program will start at 7 p.m. at Weiler's West Hills Deli, 22323 Sherman Way, West Hills, CA, 91303. Copies of the book will be available at a discount.